SMU Corporate Governance Initiative · Hilltop Forum on Capital Markets
The Hilltop Docket
Issue No. 15 · Monday, August 24, 2026 · Week in review
Issue No. 15 · Monday, August 24, 2026 · Week in review · Covering opinions posted August 17–22, 2026, with both treated in full.
Is a corporate bond indenture a trust? The Texas Business Court says no — an indenture that conveys only security interests is not an express trust, and the Texas Trust Code does not supply the indenture trustee's duties. It may be the most consequential commercial-finance ruling the court has issued. Who may read a competitor's most sensitive documents when the lawyers asking sit beyond the court's subpoena power? The court drew that line this week too. And in the Delaware file, three opinions and a stipulated closing order — on forum, oversight, officer jurisdiction, and a clause no court ever ruled on. CoStar Group deleted the clause and paid plaintiff's counsel $800,000 in fees and expenses; the court expressly declined to pass judgment on the payment. $800,000 to the lawyers, a clause deleted, and a ruling from nobody — is that the system we want? Could this happen in Texas?
On the bench · Preston Hollow Capital, LLC v. Truist Bank
| Citation | 2026 Tex. Bus. 59 (signed PDF) |
|---|---|
| Cause number | 25-BC01B-0030 |
| Court | Business Court of Texas, First Division |
| Judge | Bill Whitehill |
| Signed | Friday, August 14, 2026 |
| Designation | Published opinion |
| Codex record | Texas Business Court Codex — 2026 Tex. Bus. 59 (evidence tier A, PDF-verified) |
| Prior opinions | Preston Hollow Capital, LLC v. Truist Bank, 2025 Tex. Bus. 55, 729 S.W.3d 46 (1st Div. Dec. 19, 2025); Preston Hollow Capital, LLC v. Truist Bank, 2026 Tex. Bus. 5 (1st Div. Feb. 2, 2026) |
A corporate trust indenture that conveys only security interests — leaving legal title, possession, the maintenance obligation, and the right of redemption with the obligor — does not create an express trust. Title 9 of the Texas Property Code therefore does not supply the indenture trustee's duties; the bond documents define them.
Preston Hollow Capital bought more than $21 million of senior bonds in a 2017 senior-living financing (¶ 2). BB&T — now Truist Bank — was the indenture trustee. Alleging defaults beginning in 2019 (¶ 15), Preston Hollow sued, and among its claims were breach of fiduciary duty and a statutory breach-of-trust claim premised on the Texas Trust Code's non-waivable minimum standards. The threshold question the court took up was one the briefing had not directly presented: does the Trust Code apply at all?
It does not. The court's first path runs through title. Texas requires an express trust to separate legal from equitable title, with legal title actually transferred to the trustee. Applying the Poole factors that distinguish a security instrument from a true trust, the court found five of the seven relevant — and all five ran the same way (¶ 88) — the obligor kept possession, kept the maintenance duty, could reclaim by paying, and would take any surplus, while the trustee's power of sale arose only on default. The other two factors were not relevant here.
“Accordingly, the court concludes the entire ‘Trust Estate’ consists of only a collection of security interests, which under Texas law do not transfer full legal title, and so no express trust was formed.” — 2026 Tex. Bus. 59, ¶ 98 · single-pass, verbatim pass required
The second path runs through intent, and it is the one that will travel. Before default, the trustee's powers under Master Indenture § 8.01(a) were ministerial and its duties were only those the document specified, with no implied covenants (¶ 121). After default, the document raised the standard to that of a reasonably prudent person — but even then the trustee's powers were curtailed and subject to the bondholder's direction. Repeated use of the words “trust” and “trustee” could not manufacture what the structure withheld.
“Therefore, the court concludes that the Bond Documents do not manifest an intent to create a fiduciary relationship between Truist and the bondholders with respect to the Trust Estate and therefore do not comprise an express trust.” — 2026 Tex. Bus. 59, ¶ 116 · single-pass, verbatim pass required
Two consequences follow, and both are drafting lessons before they are doctrine. First, absent written notice in the contractual form, the trustee owed no duty to go looking for trouble:
“Accordingly, the court concludes that Truist had no duty to monitor Senior Care/Bouldin’s compliance with the Bond Documents or advise bondholders of defaults absent a written notice in the form described in the Bond Documents.” — 2026 Tex. Bus. 59, ¶ 126 · single-pass, verbatim pass required
Second — and this is the sentence bond counsel should tape to the wall — actual knowledge of a default did not substitute for the notice the indenture required. The court read § 8.03(h)'s “deem” language against the Bond Indenture's § 102(m), which expressly said both “written notice” and “actual knowledge.” The omission was treated as deliberate (¶¶ 154–156).
“So, the court concludes that Master Indenture § 8.03(h) requires Truist to receive written notice even when it might have actual knowledge of an Event of Default to trigger its heightened duties under § 8.01(b).” — 2026 Tex. Bus. 59, ¶ 151 · single-pass, verbatim pass required
The court granted Truist's Rule 166(g) requests in part — no duty to monitor, no duty to advise, absent written notice in the contractual form — while making no finding on when defaults occurred or whether notice was given, and denying without prejudice the request for a ruling on one officer's conduct because fact issues remain. The breach-of-trust claim, a creature of the Trust Code, was held moot once the Trust Code fell away (¶ 164) and dismissed with prejudice (¶ 166); the court noted its conclusions apply during the case unless later modified (¶ 167).
When a company borrows money by selling bonds, a bank is appointed and called the “trustee.” This opinion holds that the word is a job title, not a legal trust. For the duties this opinion addresses, the bank's obligations are what the loan documents say they are — nothing more is implied.
Think of a landlord who hires a property manager versus one who signs the deed over. Only the second one has handed over the thing itself. The bondholders here got the first arrangement and argued for the second.
The practical half matters more than the theory. The bank did not have to watch the borrower or warn the bondholders that trouble was coming. Its heightened duties switched on only when it received a formal written notice in the exact form the contract described — and it did not matter whether the bank already knew.
On the bench · Unimacts Global, LLC v. Ayr Energy, Inc.
| Citation | 2026 Tex. Bus. 60 (signed PDF) |
|---|---|
| Cause number | 25-BC11A-0083 |
| Court | Business Court of Texas, Eleventh Division |
| Judge | Marialyn Barnard |
| Signed | Monday, August 17, 2026 |
| Designation | Memorandum opinion |
| Codex record | Texas Business Court Codex — 2026 Tex. Bus. 60 |
Where a protective order's tiers do not unambiguously identify who qualifies as “outside counsel,” access to confidential and attorneys'-eyes-only material is resolved by balancing the risk of inadvertent disclosure or misuse against the requesting party's demonstrated need — and that inquiry is made counsel by counsel, not by category.
This is a trade-secrets fight between rival transformer manufacturers. A March 18, 2026 protective order created the familiar two tiers: confidential information, and attorneys'-eyes-only. The plaintiffs' Indian law firm — associated with the case but not counsel of record — wanted to read both. The plaintiffs said the order's plain text already gave it to them: paragraph 27 grants attorneys'-eyes-only access to “Outside Counsel Working on this Lawsuit,” and these were outside counsel working on the lawsuit.
Judge Barnard read the order as a whole rather than the phrase alone. Paragraph 26's reference to signing contractors connotes attorneys of record; read together with paragraph 27, a plausible construction is that “Outside Counsel” means the same thing. The text, in short, does not settle it — so the balancing test applies (¶¶ 14–15, 16–19), drawing on the Texas Business Court's own Westlake Longview and on Ecolab (D. Minn. 2024).
The balance was not close. Declarations from the firm’s attorneys established the association; one described having mistakenly received attorneys'-eyes-only information and discussed it with the Director of Marketing and Sales at Zetwerk, one of the plaintiffs.
“The court finds that permitting access to protected discovery materials by BTG Advaya’s attorneys creates a risk of inadvertent disclosure or misuse of those protected materials.” — 2026 Tex. Bus. 60, ¶ 32 · single-pass, verbatim pass required
Three findings drove it. The prior disclosure made the risk demonstrated rather than theoretical (¶¶ 25–27). The same attorneys were prosecuting a separate action in India against one of the defendant’s principals and advising on other matters, which is competitive-decision-making proximity by another name (¶¶ 28–29). And the attorneys sit beyond the court's subpoena power, so the remedies available if it happened again were thin (¶ 31).
On the other side of the scale, need has to be shown with specific, concrete evidence — “vague, conclusory allegations” are insufficient (¶ 34). Multiple counsel — whom the court described as well-versed in Texas law and highly competent — were already appearing, filing, and arguing (¶ 36).
“The court finds Plaintiffs have not established a significant need for BTG Advaya’s attorneys to have access to CI- and AEO-designated materials in this lawsuit.” — 2026 Tex. Bus. 60, ¶ 37 · single-pass, verbatim pass required
The court denied the firm’s attorneys access to both tiers (¶ 38).
Two competitors are suing each other, so the most sensitive documents are marked for lawyers' eyes only. One side asked the judge to let its law firm in India read them too.
The judge said no, for a reason that had nothing to do with the firm's competence. Think of the judge as the keeper of a locked file room, and the request as asking for one more key. Before handing one over, the judge asks three practical questions: has this person handled a key safely before, can I enforce the rules if something goes wrong, and do the lawyers already inside need the help?
Here, all three answers cut the same way. One of the firm's lawyers had already received a protected document by mistake and talked about it with a sales executive at Zetwerk, one of the companies suing — precisely the harm the label exists to prevent. If it happened again, a Texas court has no practical way to make lawyers in India answer for it. And the Texas lawyers already inside the room had the case well in hand.
The Delaware file · four matters, four prices
Four Delaware matters belong in this issue — three opinions and a stipulated closing order. One dates from April; the rest landed in the past two weeks. They run together because each puts a price on something. Masimo Corp. v. Kiani prices a forum. Altigen Communications, Inc. v. Day prices a Delaware court's reach over a nonresident officer. In re Boeing prices an oversight claim at nothing, dismissing it before discovery. And Gilbert v. CoStar Group prices a governance clause at $800,000, with no ruling attached. None of the four is about whose case law is deeper. All four are about what a dispute costs and who decides it — the operational questions that sit underneath the precedent-depth debate rather than settling it.
1 · A Delaware company's Delaware claims go to California
| Citation | Masimo Corp. v. Kiani, C.A. No. 2024-1086-NAC (Del. Ch. Apr. 21, 2026) (Cook, V.C.) — opinion |
|---|---|
| Submitted | December 15, 2025 |
| Decided | April 21, 2026 |
For agreements within 8 Del. C. § 122(18), the statute legislatively overrides § 115's guarantee that Delaware remains an available forum and displaces the independent-source principle. A corporation's Delaware forum bylaw yields to a forum clause in a § 122(18) stockholder agreement the corporation itself signed.
Masimo's bylaw routed internal-affairs claims to Delaware — “[u]nless the [Company] consents in writing to the selection of an alternative forum.” Its founder and former chief executive, Joe Kiani — still a stockholder, and the company's controller — had an employment agreement carrying a California forum clause. Because that agreement qualified as a § 122(18) stockholder agreement — a governance agreement between the corporation and its controller — the court held the clause valid and compelled Masimo's claims to California, and held that § 122(18) had legislatively overridden the line of cases holding that fiduciary claims arising independently of a contract cannot be swept into the contract's forum clause.
“Therefore, for purposes of stockholder agreements, § 122(18) legislatively overrides Parfi, Feeley, OTK, and Harris’s reliance on the Independent-Source Principle.” — Masimo Corp. v. Kiani, p. 21 · single-pass, verbatim pass required
So a Delaware corporation, suing on its own behalf under Delaware law, to invalidate terms it says were the product of fiduciary breaches, will have those questions answered in Orange County's Superior Court. Kiani's motion to dismiss was granted.
Masimo wrote a house rule: fights about this company happen in Delaware. Then it signed a contract with its founder, Joe Kiani — who still controlled the company and held a large block of its stock: fights about this contract happen in California. The court held the contract beat the house rule — because the house rule had a door in it, and the company walked through the door itself when it signed. The part most summaries skip: the door only opened because of who was on the other side of the contract and what it did. A governance deal with the company's own controller counts; an ordinary employment contract with an ordinary executive is not that kind of deal.
Texas supplies the governing-document half of this architecture. Under TBOC § 2.115(b)(1) (as amended by S.B. 29 § 3, eff. May 14, 2025, and reenacted by S.B. 2411 § 2, eff. Sept. 1, 2025), a Texas entity's governing documents may require that internal entity claims “be brought only in a court in this state” — and § 2.115(b)(2) lets them designate one or more Texas courts having jurisdiction as the exclusive forum and venue.
Texas also has a shareholders'-agreement regime, and it is worth stating precisely rather than waving at. TBOC § 21.101(a)(1) lets shareholders agree to an arrangement that “restricts the discretion or powers of the board of directors,” and TBOC § 21.104 makes a compliant agreement “effective among the shareholders and between the shareholders and the corporation even if the terms of the agreement are inconsistent with this code.” But it must be approved or signed by all shareholders at the time of the agreement (§ 21.101(b)) — and it ceases to be effective when the shares are listed on a national securities exchange or regularly traded in a market maintained by members of a securities association (TBOC § 21.109(a)).
The supportable contrast is narrower than a “no analogue” claim, and it is still sharp. Section 122(18) needs no shareholder unanimity and reaches contracts with current or prospective stockholders and beneficial owners, in that capacity; Texas's Subchapter C mechanism cannot supply that route once either § 21.109(a) trigger applies. But TBOC § 21.110 expressly preserves other agreements between a corporation and its shareholders permitted by law. And what happens when a separate executive agreement points somewhere else? Neither § 2.115 nor Subchapter C says. Masimo answered that question under Delaware law, for a § 122(18) agreement — it did not decide it for a Texas corporation.
Which is why the lesson is diligence, not comfort. A forum provision in the charter is worth what the officer and executive agreements allow it to be worth. Pull the executive agreements, read the forum and choice-of-law clauses, and compare them with the governing documents; where they point in different directions, the conflict is analyzed under the law that governs the entity and the contract — not assumed away. Masimo shows why the comparison matters; it does not predetermine the Texas answer.
2 · The eight hundred thousand dollars that bought no law
| Matter | Gilbert v. CoStar Group, Inc., C.A. No. 2026-0182-KSJM (Del. Ch., filed Feb. 9, 2026; closed Aug. 12, 2026) |
|---|---|
| Closing order | Stipulation and order governing fee award and closing the action (granted Aug. 12, 2026; hosted by plaintiff’s counsel) |
| Company statement | CoStar Group resolves Delaware litigation (Aug. 14, 2026) |
| Outcome | Claim mooted; $800,000 in fees and expenses paid; no ruling on the merits |
A stockholder alleged that the change-in-control provision in CoStar Group's executive severance plan violated Delaware law — specifically a “Director Clause” keyed to board composition, the sort of dead-hand feature that makes a proxy contest expensive to win. The company removed the clause. The claim went moot. The case closed on August 12, and CoStar paid $800,000 in attorneys' fees and expenses.
In the company’s own words: “Without admitting any fault or wrongdoing, CoStar Group, in its business judgment, agreed to pay $800,000 in attorneys’ fees and expenses to the plaintiff’s counsel as a mootness fee, resolving the matter in full satisfaction of any and all related claims by the plaintiff and his counsel.” (release) The company further states that “[i]n entering the order, the Court did not review, and did not pass judgment on, the payment of the mootness fee.” (release) The stipulated order the Court granted on August 12 says it in the order’s own words:
“WHEREAS, the Court has not and will not pass judgment on the payment of the Mootness Fee;” — Gilbert v. CoStar Group, Inc., C.A. No. 2026-0182-KSJM (Del. Ch. Aug. 12, 2026), stipulated order, p. 3 · verbatim, verified against the order 2026-08-22 · PDF link opens at the page (PDF viewers do not support in-page text highlighting; hosted by plaintiff’s counsel)
The broader “did not review” phrasing is CoStar’s.
No opinion. No holding. No precedent. A complaint, an unresolved motion to expedite, a deleted clause, and a payment.
A shareholder sued over one clause in an executive pay plan. The company deleted the clause. Nobody ever decided whether the clause was legal. The company then paid the shareholder's lawyers $800,000 to make the case go away — and the order itself recites that the court “has not and will not pass judgment” on that payment.
This is the best available answer to a familiar objection to reincorporating in Texas — that Texas lacks Delaware's accumulated case law.
Anthony Rickey makes the argument in recent commentary, and CoStar is his example: Delaware did not generate law here either. What it generated was a price. Delaware transactional counsel can now tell a client that a dead-hand provision draws a suit and, likely, a fee — so fewer boards adopt one. That is a rule in everything but name, and it cost $800,000 to write.
Texas arrives at certainty by the opposite road. Texas prices the same resolution differently, by two different instruments. In an action certified as a class action, Tex. R. Civ. P. 42(h)–(i) (Rule 42(i) adopted by the 2003 amendments; official compilation last amended July 1, 2026) requires the court, when it awards fees, to set a lodestar and keep the award within 25% to 400% of it — and where any portion of the class recovery is noncash, fees must follow the recovery's cash and noncash proportions. Would a governance fix count as a “noncash common benefit” under that rule? No Texas court has yet been shown to say. And if the claim travels as a derivative proceeding, the fee authority is TBOC § 21.561(b)(1) instead: expenses only where the proceeding “resulted in a substantial benefit to the corporation,” with disclosure-only benefits excluded (§ 21.561(c), enacted twice in 2025 — S.B. 29 § 15 and S.B. 2411 § 28). And on the derivative path the sharpest contrast is procedural: in Texas a derivative proceeding “may not be discontinued or settled without court approval” (TBOC § 21.560, inapplicable only to closely held corporations, § 21.563(b)) — the discontinuance itself requires the judicial pass that the CoStar order recites the Delaware court never made.
What would a Texas court award on these facts? No primary source says. What the sources do say is enough: Delaware's resolution produced an agreed $800,000 payment with no ruling attached, and Texas's fee authorities are built to interrogate exactly that kind of resolution — by certification posture, claim form, and the character of the benefit.
Whether that is a good trade is a real argument, and Rickey concedes the other side of it: plaintiff-side counsel would say a result that discourages dead-hand provisions is worth what it costs. The narrower point is the one that lands — “the better debate is over the substantive result, not that representative lawsuits are necessary to provide legal clarity.”
3 · In brief
Oversight claims still fail at the gate. In re The Boeing Co. Derivative Litigation, Consol. C.A. No. 2024-1210-MTZ (Del. Ch. Aug. 13, 2026) (Zurn, V.C.) — opinion.
- The complaint alleged an extensive set of red flags; the Caremark claims arising from the door-plug failure were dismissed for failure to plead demand futility under Court of Chancery Rule 23.1.
- The line to keep: “Delaware law does not hold corporate fiduciaries liable merely because a general risk materialized” (p. 2).
- Many of the pleaded red flags “spoke to business risk, not legal risk” (p. 31), and red flags must be “sufficiently similar” to “the corporate trauma in question” such that the board’s conscious inaction “proximately caused that trauma” (p. 35).
Delaware screens these claims through demand futility. Texas’s derivative statute contains no futility exception to plead around; for a Texas corporation with listed shares it screens through two gates — a demand gate that always applies and an elective ownership gate. TBOC § 21.552(a)(3), as amended by S.B. 29 § 13, conditions derivative standing — for a corporation “with common shares listed on a national securities exchange or a corporation that has made an affirmative election to be governed by Section 21.419 and has 500 or more shareholders” — on the shareholder meeting an ownership threshold identified in the corporation’s certificate of formation or bylaws, capped at three percent of outstanding shares. If the governing documents identify no threshold, the statute supplies none; it is not a universal Texas rule. The amended § 21.552(a) applies only to derivative proceedings instituted on or after May 14, 2025 (S.B. 29 § 26). Where a threshold has been adopted, the screen is categorical and mechanical — share ownership — where Delaware’s demand-futility inquiry is conduct-based and fact-intensive. The demand gate is TBOC § 21.553(a): a shareholder “may not institute a derivative proceeding until the 91st day after the date a written demand is filed with the corporation,” and the statute’s exceptions excuse only the 90-day wait — never the demand itself. The subchapter’s gates fall away only for a closely held corporation — fewer than 35 shareholders and no listed or over-the-counter shares (TBOC § 21.563(a), (b), as amended by S.B. 2411 § 30) — a class a listed corporation can never occupy. And the elective threshold, where adopted, need not be met by one holder alone: under § 21.551(2)(C), as amended by S.B. 29 § 12, “shareholder” includes “two or more shareholders acting in concert under an informal or formal agreement or understanding with respect to a derivative proceeding” — and § 21.552(a)(3) conditions standing on “the shareholder” so defined, so the threshold can be met by holders acting in concert. The gates also travel with the charter: in a derivative proceeding in the right of a foreign corporation, TBOC § 21.562(a) (as amended by S.B. 29 § 16 and S.B. 2411 § 29) sends these standing rules to the law of the jurisdiction of formation — which gate a company faces is decided by where it is chartered.
Delaware's officer-consent statute has limits. Altigen Communications, Inc. v. Day, C.A. No. 2025-1298-JTL (Del. Ch. Aug. 21, 2026) (Laster, V.C.) — opinion.
- A Chief Strategy Officer is not within 10 Del. C. § 3114(b) unless the position's responsibilities functionally equate to, or significantly overlap with, those of a role the statute names (p. 17).
- The court noted the company could have obtained personal jurisdiction by contract — its own employment agreement instead gave the Denver courts exclusive jurisdiction over “any action arising out of or relating to” that agreement (p. 35 n.74).
- Day’s Rule 12(b)(2) motion was granted.
The current Texas Business Organizations Code contains no counterpart that deems an officer to consent to jurisdiction by accepting or serving in office. A Texas court needs another basis to reach a nonresident officer: contractual consent, or the long-arm statute plus federal due process — statutory authorization and constitutionally sufficient minimum contacts, per Luciano v. SprayFoamPolymers.com, LLC, 625 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2021). A fact-bound route, not an automatic one — which is why the contract is the predictable path, not the only one.
Dockets and calendar
| Date | Matter | Court · judge | Setting |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mon, Aug 31 9:00 a.m. | PanOptis Patent Management, LLC, et al. v. Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd., et al. 24-BC01A-0015 | 1st Div. (1a) · Bouressa | Motion |
| Wed, Sep 2 10:30 a.m. | Cobalt Falcon, LLC v. AXS Investments, LLC 25-BC01A-0023 · 2026 Tex. Bus. 43 | 1st Div. (1a) · Bouressa | Pre-trial conference |
| Fri, Sep 4 10:00 a.m. | Beard v. Beard 25-BC01B-0036 | 1st Div. (1b) · Whitehill | Pre-trial conference |
| Mon, Sep 14 9:00 a.m. | Plains Oryx Permian Basin Pipeline LLC, et al. v. Texas-New Mexico Pipe Line Company, et al. 25-BC11A-0030 · 2026 Tex. Bus. 29 | 11th Div. (11a) · Bullard | Pre-trial conference |
| Wed, Sep 16 9:00 a.m. | Cobalt Falcon, LLC v. AXS Investments, LLC 25-BC01A-0023 | 1st Div. (1a) · Bouressa | Bench trial |
| Mon, Sep 21 9:00 a.m. | Plains Oryx Permian Basin Pipeline LLC, et al. 25-BC11A-0030 | 11th Div. (11a) · Bullard | Bench trial |
| Thu, Sep 24 2:00 p.m. | Clean Hydrogen Works, LLC, et al. v. Denbury Carbon Solutions, LLC, Exxon Mobil Corporation, et al. 25-BC11A-0017 · 2026 Tex. Bus. 58 | 11th Div. (11a) · Adrogué | Pre-trial conference |
| Mon, Sep 28 9:00 a.m. | Clean Hydrogen Works, LLC, et al. 25-BC11A-0017 | 11th Div. (11a) · Adrogué | Trial on the merits |
| Mon, Sep 28 10:00 a.m. | Beard v. Beard 25-BC01B-0036 | 1st Div. (1b) · Whitehill | Jury trial |
| Wed, Sep 30 9:30 a.m. | Clean Hydrogen Works, LLC, et al. 25-BC11A-0017 | 11th Div. (11a) · Adrogué | Special appearance |
The alert feed shows no Business Court setting in the week of August 24. The next setting it carries is Monday, August 31.
One entry in the Clean Hydrogen Works series does not sequence sensibly: the feed places a special appearance on September 30, two days after a trial on the merits. We print the feed as it stands and flag it rather than quietly reordering it. Anyone relying on those dates should check the docket.
Carried forward
- The Daley claims in CAM Industrial Solutions remain live. No change on the register this week.
- Whether Jackson goes up — petition status still unconfirmed.
- A final judgment in Sri Shirdi — fee-ruling status still unconfirmed.
- Rebuilding the alert searches. The re:SearchTX saved searches still need re-scoping, and the docket-alert feed is running seven days behind.