Legal & Litigation Risk

Section 12 of 12

Primary sources

Bluebook 21st-edition citations with active primary-source hyperlinks. Practitioner blog commentary appears only as the secondary anchor where the doctrinal claim itself requires citing it, and only alongside the primary source.

Long-form source as of 2026-08-10

Sources · primary authorities
  1. Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805 (Del. 2019), courts.delaware.gov/Opinions/Download.aspx?id=291200. Revived the Caremark oversight doctrine and articulated the “mission-critical” risk-monitoring standard for boards. The doctrinal baseline for all officer-Caremark questions on the Texas / Nevada migration. ↑
  2. In re McDonald’s Corp. S’holder Deriv. Litig., 2023 WL 387292 (Del. Ch. Jan. 26, 2023) (Laster, V.C.), courts.delaware.gov/Opinions/Download.aspx?id=343130. Extended the Caremark oversight duty to corporate officers commensurate with their areas of responsibility. The key authority for any officer-Caremark pleading post-reincorporation. ↑
  3. Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014), law.justia.com/cases/delaware/supreme-court/2014/334-2013.html. The MFW controller-cleansing framework: ab initio conditioning on (i) a fully empowered, well-functioning special committee, and (ii) approval by an informed, uncoerced majority of the minority shifts review from entire fairness to business judgment. ↑
  4. Delaware Senate Bill 21, 153d Gen. Assemb. (Del. 2025) (eff. Mar. 25, 2025), legis.delaware.gov/SessionLaws/Chapter?id=110100 (adding DGCL § 144 and amending DGCL § 220). The 2025 Delaware reform bill that codified safe-harbor procedures for director-conflicted and controller-conflicted transactions, narrowed § 220 inspection reach, and reset the doctrinal baseline against which Texas / Nevada migrations are now measured. ↑
  5. Guzman v. Johnson, 483 P.3d 531 (Nev. 2021), law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2021/79818.html. The Nevada Supreme Court’s controlling authority for the proposition that NRS § 78.138(7) is the sole avenue to hold individual directors and officers liable for damages, even in interested-fiduciary transactions. Forecloses the Shoen v. SAC inherent-fairness avenue. ↑
  6. Chur v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 458 P.3d 336 (Nev. 2020), law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2020/78301.html. Companion ruling to Guzman: the Nevada statutory liability shield governs even where the alleged fiduciary breach involves self-interested conduct. Counsel cannot rebut the statutory BJR by invoking common-law inherent fairness. ↑
  7. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986), law.justia.com/cases/delaware/supreme-court/1986/506-a-2d-173-1.html. Delaware’s enhanced-scrutiny standard for board conduct in change-of-control transactions. Has no published Texas or Nevada analog after the 2025 codification cycle. ↑
  8. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985), law.justia.com/cases/delaware/supreme-court/1985/493-a-2d-946-9.html. Delaware’s intermediate-scrutiny standard for board defensive measures. The closest Texas analog is TBOC § 21.401(b), which authorizes consideration of long-term interests and continued independence; the coverage is materially narrower. ↑
  9. Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code Ann. § 21.401(b) (West 2025), statutes.capitol.texas.gov/Docs/BO/htm/BO.21.htm#21.401. Permits Texas corporation boards to consider long-term interests of the corporation and the desirability of maintaining continued independence in making management decisions. Partial proxy for Revlon / Unocal — not a substitute. ↑
  10. Lebanon Cnty. Emps.’ Ret. Fund v. AmerisourceBergen Corp., 243 A.3d 417 (Del. 2020), law.justia.com/cases/delaware/supreme-court/2020/60-2020.html. Pre-SB-21 Delaware Supreme Court authority extending § 220 inspection to corporate emails when reasonably necessary for the demand’s purpose. Now substantially modified by the post-SB-21 rewrite of § 220. ↑
  11. DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., 172 A.3d 346 (Del. 2017), courts.delaware.gov/Opinions/Download.aspx?id=260990. Delaware Supreme Court’s anchor authority on appraisal-arbitrage practice; pushed deal-price-with-synergy-adjustments as the operative methodology. ↑
  12. Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., 210 A.3d 128 (Del. 2019), law.justia.com/cases/delaware/supreme-court/2019/368-2018.html. Reinforced the deal-price-with-synergy methodology in appraisal. Nevada has not generated a comparable appraisal-litigation record. ↑
  13. Texas Senate Bill 29, 89th Leg., R.S. (Tex. 2025) (eff. May 14, 2025), capitol.texas.gov/tlodocs/89R/billtext/html/SB00029F.HTM; bill history at capitol.texas.gov/BillLookup/History.aspx?LegSess=89R&Bill=SB29. Adds TBOC § 1.057 (Texas-first source-of-law rule; originally added at § 1.056 by S.B. 29 § 2, renumbered to § 1.057 by S.B. 2411 § 16, eff. Sept. 1, 2025), § 2.115 (exclusive Texas forum), § 2.116 (jury-trial waiver), § 21.419 (codified BJR for listed and opt-in corps), § 21.4161 (pre-transaction committee-independence determination), § 21.552(a)(3) (3% derivative threshold), and amends §§ 21.218 and 21.553. The 2025 officer-exculpation amendment to TBOC § 7.001 was enacted separately by S.B. 2411, 89th Leg., R.S. (Tex. 2025) (effective Sept. 1, 2025). ↑
  14. Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934 (Del. Ch. 2013) (Strine, C.), courts.delaware.gov/opinions/download.aspx?ID=190990. The Delaware authority validating internal-affairs forum-selection bylaws against statutory challenge. The doctrinal anchor for TBOC § 2.115’s statutory grant. ↑
  15. Salzberg v. Sciabacucchi, 227 A.3d 102 (Del. 2020), courts.delaware.gov/Opinions/Download.aspx?id=303310. Held that Delaware corporations may adopt charter provisions designating federal court as the exclusive forum for Securities Act § 11 claims. Anchor for federal-forum-provision analysis; does not control Exchange Act derivative claims, which are claim-specific. ↑
  16. Lee v. Fisher, 70 F.4th 1129 (9th Cir. 2023) (en banc), cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2023/06/01/21-15923.pdf. Ninth Circuit treatment of state-court forum-selection bylaws applied to Exchange Act § 14(a) derivative claims. The procedural analysis differs from Salzberg and remains the operative federal-circuit authority for derivative-suit forum analysis. ↑
  17. Gusinsky v. Reynolds, No. 3:25-cv-01816-K (N.D. Tex. Mar. 17, 2026) (Kinkeade, J.) (order granting motion to dismiss). The first identified federal-court decision enforcing an SB 29 ownership-threshold bylaw under TBOC § 21.552(a)(3). Dismissed with prejudice a 100-share derivative complaint against Southwest Airlines. Did not reach the plaintiff’s dormant Commerce Clause, internal-affairs scope, or Texas Constitution defenses. Practitioner-alert tracking via Gibson Dunn, Foley & Lardner, and Hunton Andrews Kurth (practitioner alerts cited for tracking only; not as primary URL targets). ↑ ↑
  18. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982), supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/457/624/. Plurality opinion invalidating Illinois’s antitakeover statute as an impermissible burden on interstate commerce. The constitutional ceiling on extraterritorial reach of state corporate-law statutes. ↑
  19. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987), supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/481/69/. Upheld an Indiana antitakeover statute as a permissible regulation of internal corporate affairs. Together with MITE, defines the internal-affairs / dormant Commerce Clause boundary; both are unadjudicated against SB 29. ↑
  20. Coinbase Global, Inc., Preliminary Information Statement on Schedule 14C, filed Nov. 12, 2025 (accession 0001679788-25-000218), sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1679788/000167978825000218; Coinbase Form 8-K filed Dec. 15, 2025 (accession 0001679788-25-000247), sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1679788/0001679788-25-000247-index.html. Documents the December 15, 2025 effective-date and the written-consent approval mechanics under DGCL § 228 by a Class-B supervoting bloc led by founders Brian Armstrong and Fred Ehrsam through personal stockholdings and affiliated trusts. ↑
  21. Salzberg v. Sciabacucchi, 227 A.3d 102 (Del. 2020) (federal-forum-provision validity for Securities Act § 11 claims); Securities Act § 14 (anti-waiver), 15 U.S.C. § 77n; Exchange Act § 29(a) (anti-waiver), 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a); Exchange Act § 27 (federal-court jurisdiction), 15 U.S.C. § 78aa. The three statutory and case authorities most often relied upon for the proposition that state-law internal-affairs forum bylaws do not displace federal jurisdiction for federal-securities claims.
  22. Texas H.B. 19, 88th Leg., R.S. (Tex. 2023), capitol.texas.gov/tlodocs/88R/billtext/html/HB00019F.HTM (codified at Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. ch. 25A); Texas S.B. 1045, 88th Leg., R.S. (Tex. 2023), capitol.texas.gov/tlodocs/88R/billtext/html/SB01045F.HTM (creating the Fifteenth Court of Appeals); Texas H.B. 40, 89th Leg., R.S. (Tex. 2025), capitol.texas.gov/tlodocs/89R/billtext/html/HB00040F.HTM. The institutional architecture: H.B. 19 establishes the Texas Business Court; S.B. 1045 establishes the Fifteenth Court of Appeals; H.B. 40 expands the Business Court (lowered amount-in-controversy threshold to $5M, joined-party aggregation, jurisdictional expansion, sunset removal).
  23. Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code Ann. § 21.552(a)(3) (West 2025), statutes.capitol.texas.gov/Docs/BO/htm/BO.21.htm#21.552; Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code Ann. § 21.553 (West 2025), statutes.capitol.texas.gov/Docs/BO/htm/BO.21.htm#21.553. The derivative-action architecture as amended by SB 29: the elective ≤ 3% ownership-threshold mechanism (§ 21.552(a)(3)) plus universal demand (§ 21.553). Adoption status must be confirmed in the corporation’s certificate or bylaws.
  24. Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code Ann. § 21.419 (West 2025), statutes.capitol.texas.gov/Docs/BO/htm/BO.21.htm#21.419. Codifies the business-judgment rule for covered corporations — corporations whose voting shares are listed on a national securities exchange (default coverage) and corporations that affirmatively elect coverage (opt-in). Director and officer presumed to act in good faith, on an informed basis, in furtherance of the corporation’s interests, and in obedience to law; rebuttal requires particularized facts pleaded with specificity.
  25. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 78.138(3), (7) (2025), leg.state.nv.us/nrs/nrs-078.html#NRS078Sec138 (official Nevada Legislature target); parallel: law.justia.com/codes/nevada/chapter-78/statute-78-138/. Nevada’s statutory liability shield. A director or officer is not individually liable for damages absent (i) rebuttal of the statutory presumption that the actor acted on an informed basis, in good faith, and with a view to the corporation’s interests, and (ii) proof that the act both constituted a fiduciary breach and involved intentional misconduct, fraud, or a knowing violation of law.
Note on citation form and source discipline

A note on citation form and source discipline

This page follows the SMU Corporate Governance Initiative’s standing citation protocol: Bluebook 21st-edition format for every citation, with a short explanatory note appended to each footnote describing what the source contributes. Every cited authority — statute, case, journal article, SEC filing, or institutional statement — carries an active hyperlink to a primary or authoritative source: the issuing court (or a Justia / CourtListener mirror) for opinions; statutes.capitol.texas.gov for codified Texas statutes; capitol.texas.gov for enrolled Texas bills; delcode.delaware.gov for the Delaware General Corporation Law and legis.delaware.gov for Delaware session laws; leg.state.nv.us for Nevada Revised Statutes (with Justia mirrors as parallel reader-access links); Cornell LII for federal U.S. Code and CFR; and sec.gov for SEC filings and statements. Practitioner alerts (Gibson Dunn, Foley & Lardner, Hunton Andrews Kurth, Paul Hastings, Baker Botts, Sidley) may appear in the prose as commentary or tracking citations but are never used as primary URL targets for statutes, cases, or filings on this page.

Two doctrinal claims commonly attributed to Texas / Nevada migration analysis are not asserted on this page because no primary appellate authority decides them: (i) whether Caremark / Marchand officer-oversight pleadings survive a motion to dismiss under codified Texas BJR (TBOC § 21.419) on the equivalent facts; and (ii) whether Maffei v. Palkon’s clear-day business-judgment standard extends to dual-class supervoting reincorporations approved by written consent under DGCL § 228. Both are open. Counsel relying on this page for a live matter should verify each primary source and consult counsel for any specific matter.

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