V09 · Nevada

Effective May 30, 2025

Nevada Assembly Bill 239: jury waivers, fiduciary duties, and a codified controller framework.

AB 239 amends multiple distinct NRS sections to sharpen Nevada's controller-protective statutory model. It adds new authority for articles-of-incorporation provisions requiring internal actions to be tried before a judge rather than a jury (§ 78.046), amends the director-and-officer fiduciary-duty framework (§ 78.138), and codifies a narrow controlling-stockholder duty with a disinterested-committee safe-harbor presumption.

Canonical citation. A.B. 239, 83d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2025). Codified principally at Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 78.046, 78.138, 78.240. Signed by Governor Joe Lombardo; effective May 30, 2025. Enrolled act: leg.state.nv.us/App/NELIS/REL/83rd2025/Bill/12345/Overview. Codified NRS ch. 78: leg.state.nv.us/NRS/NRS-078.html.

Executive summary

Three substantive moves in one bill.

AB 239 should be read as three substantively independent moves bundled into a single legislative vehicle. The first is an authority-granting move — new NRS § 78.046 authorizes articles-of-incorporation provisions requiring internal actions to proceed before a judge rather than a jury. The second is a doctrinal-refinement move — the existing NRS § 78.138 director-and-officer fiduciary-duty framework is amended to clarify the operative liability standard. The third is a codification move — AB 239 adds a controlling-stockholder definition to NRS Chapter 78 along with a narrow statutory duty and a safe-harbor presumption against breach when disinterested-committee approval is obtained.

Each move is doctrinally distinct, and the three should be cited with section-specific pin-cites to avoid the common drafting error of collapsing them into a single reference. Per ERRATA-2026-05-19 Item 3, the § 78.046 jury-trial-waiver provision is structurally separate from the § 78.138 fiduciary-duty framework; secondary coverage that conflates them is incorrect.

Three sections, three moves

What AB 239 changed.

NRS § 78.046 · new authority

Jury-trial waiver for internal actions.

AB 239 adds new NRS § 78.046 authorizing Nevada corporations to include articles-of-incorporation provisions requiring "internal actions" (corporate fiduciary claims arising from the internal affairs of the corporation) to be tried before a judge rather than a jury. The provision is parallel in function to TBOC § 2.116 (added by Texas SB 29) but structurally distinct: Nevada's authority is at the articles-of-incorporation level rather than at the broader governing-documents level. The jury-trial-waiver provision must be in the articles to be enforceable; bylaw provisions alone are insufficient.

NRS § 78.138 · amended

Director-and-officer fiduciary-duty framework.

The existing NRS § 78.138 framework, which already operated as a relatively defendant-favorable statutory regime relative to Delaware common-law fiduciary doctrine, is amended to clarify the operative liability standard. The amendments tighten the pleading and evidentiary requirements for breaches of director-and-officer duties and align the statutory framework with Nevada's broader competitive proposition as a controller-protective alternative to Delaware. The full text of the amended § 78.138 should be consulted for the exact pleading and proof requirements.

Controlling-stockholder framework · new codification

Controller definition, single duty, and safe-harbor presumption.

AB 239 codifies a controlling-stockholder framework that previously existed in Nevada law only as a matter of judicial gloss. The new framework includes three components: (i) a definition of "controlling stockholder" centered on voting power "to elect at least a majority of the corporation's directors"; (ii) a single statutory duty requiring the controller to refrain from inducing a director or officer to breach his or her duty to the corporation, where the breach (a) results in a transaction giving the controller a material, nonspeculative, and nonratable benefit, and (b) causes detriment to the corporation or its stockholders; (iii) a safe-harbor presumption against breach when the transaction is approved by a disinterested committee or board under specified conditions.

Pin-cite discipline · ERRATA-2026-05-19 Item 3

Several early secondary sources conflated NRS § 78.046 (the new jury-trial-waiver authority) with NRS § 78.138 (the amended D&O fiduciary-duty framework), or treated them as a single integrated reform. They are structurally separate: § 78.046 is the new authority-granting provision; § 78.138 is the amended duty framework; and the controlling-stockholder framework is a third codification that interacts with both but is independent of either. SMU CGI canonical materials must cite each section separately and avoid loose secondary-source paraphrases that collapse the three.

The Nevada framing

A controller-protective regime, sharpened.

Nevada's competitive proposition to issuers reconsidering Delaware has long centered on its statutory regime being more defendant-favorable than Delaware common-law fiduciary doctrine. AB 239 sharpens that proposition along three margins. First, the § 78.046 jury-trial-waiver authority gives Nevada-incorporated corporations a clear statutory path to bench trials for internal-actions fiduciary claims — a procedural feature attractive to deal planners concerned about jury unpredictability in business disputes. Second, the § 78.138 amendments tighten the pleading and evidentiary standards for D&O liability. Third, the codified controlling-stockholder framework narrows the controller's statutory duty relative to the broader common-law controller doctrine that has developed in Delaware Chancery, particularly post-Tornetta.

The structural choice to bundle the three reforms into a single bill reflects Nevada's compressed legislative calendar (the Nevada legislature meets only in odd-numbered years for 120-day sessions) and the legislative-coalition dynamics of moving multiple corporate-law reforms simultaneously. The post-enactment doctrinal development will depend on how Nevada courts (the Nevada Supreme Court hears business-court appeals under the existing district-court structure) interpret the new codified standards.

Comparison to the SB 21 and SB 29 architectures

AB 239's architectural choice differs from both Delaware SB 21 and Texas SB 29 in instructive ways. Where Delaware SB 21 retains entire-fairness review outside its statutory safe harbors, Nevada's amended § 78.138 framework operates as the dominant statutory standard, with the controlling-stockholder framework operating as a narrow additional duty rather than as a separate equitable framework. Where Texas SB 29 codifies the business-judgment rule with procedural accelerators (§§ 21.4161, 21.554), Nevada relies on the statutory standard itself without comparable expedited procedures. The three states' choices converge on similar defendant-favorable outcomes through structurally distinct routes.

Doctrinal context

Nevada in the 2024-2026 reform cycle.

Nevada's positioning in the broader 2024–2026 reform cycle has been distinctive. While Delaware and Texas have moved the most visibly — Delaware reacting to the post-Tornetta controller-litigation environment, Texas building a parallel rule-of-code regime — Nevada has moved less visibly but no less substantively. AB 239's three-part architecture is the most significant single-bill amendment to NRS Chapter 78 in more than a decade.

The SMU CGI Reincorporation Tracker documents the Nevada-inbound redomiciliation cohort — firms moving from Delaware or other states INTO Nevada — as a smaller but doctrinally important subset of the broader migration pattern. NL Industries (NJ→NV, 2026) and AIEV / Thunder Power Holdings (DE→NV, 2026) are two of the most recent and most visible Nevada-inbound moves; both occurred after AB 239's enactment. Whether Nevada's competitive proposition is now sharper enough to accelerate the Nevada-inbound subset relative to the Texas-inbound subset is an empirical question the next 24–36 months will answer.

Open questions

What Nevada courts and the bar will resolve.

1. How aggressively will Nevada courts interpret the controlling-stockholder safe-harbor presumption?

The disinterested-committee approval safe-harbor is the most important practical feature of the new controller framework. The first cohort of post-AB-239 controller-transaction litigation will define how robust the presumption is in practice. A vigorously enforced presumption substantially reduces controller-transaction exposure; a more skeptical judicial application reduces the doctrinal innovation's practical reach.

2. Does the § 78.046 jury-trial-waiver authority interact with the Seventh Amendment in federal proceedings?

State-law jury-trial-waiver provisions in corporate governing documents have not been definitively tested in federal court for federal-question internal-affairs claims. The Texas equivalent (§ 2.116) is more recent, and the Delaware Salzberg v. Sciabacucchi analytical framework was developed in a different doctrinal context. The federal-court interaction is the first significant open doctrinal question.

3. How does Nevada's adoption curve compare to Texas's?

The SMU CGI adoption tracker surfaces the empirical record. Nevada's NRS § 78.046 articles-of-incorporation requirement is structurally more demanding (articles amendment requires both board and stockholder approval) than Texas's TBOC § 2.116 governing-documents authority. Comparing adoption rates between the two states' jury-trial-waiver provisions is the cleanest empirical comparison available.

4. Will the SEC's post-Nov-17-2025 (i)(1) state-law improper-subject route apply to Nevada-incorporated firms?

The SEC Division of Corporation Finance's November 17, 2025 process retreat applies to Rule 14a-8 proposals across all U.S. issuers regardless of state of incorporation. Whether Nevada law's relatively narrow proper-subject doctrine creates a comparable exclusion pathway to Delaware's developing improper-subject theory is an open federal-state question. The Nevada equivalent has not been developed in Nevada Supreme Court jurisprudence and has not received the same SEC Chair-level endorsement that Delaware's theory received from Chair Atkins's October 2025 Weinberg Center keynote.

Primary sources

Where every footnote on this page points.

Per the SMU CGI primary-sources-only rule, every citation on this page hyperlinks the primary source.