V09 · Texas
Enacted May 14, 2025Texas Senate Bill 29: the TBOC rule-of-code overhaul.
SB 29 is the central 2025 Texas corporate-governance reform. It codifies a business-judgment presumption for listed and opt-in Texas corporations, authorizes exclusive Texas forum and jury-trial waivers for internal-entity claims, adds a pre-transaction independence-determination procedure and a post-demand evidentiary-hearing procedure, narrows books-and-records access in specified contexts, and permits eligible corporations to adopt a derivative-standing threshold of up to 3% of outstanding shares.
Page contents
On this page
- Executive summary
- Section-by-section
- § 21.419 — business-judgment rule
- § 21.552 — derivative-standing threshold (dual-axis canonical)
- §§ 21.4161 / 21.554 — pre-transaction vs post-demand procedure
- §§ 2.115 / 2.116 — forum and jury-trial waivers
- § 21.218 — books-and-records reform
- Doctrinal context
- Open questions
- Primary sources
Executive summary
What SB 29 does.
Where Delaware SB 21 reorganizes a standards-based regime around statutory safe harbors that protect transactions inside the safe harbor while preserving entire-fairness review outside it, Texas SB 29 takes a different architectural approach: it codifies a business-judgment-rule presumption (TBOC § 21.419) and builds a procedural apparatus around it. Where Delaware leaves litigation to develop case-by-case under the post-SB 21 standards, Texas adds two procedural tools — a pre-transaction independence determination (§ 21.4161) and a post-demand evidentiary-hearing procedure (§ 21.554) — that allow corporations and courts to resolve fiduciary questions on accelerated timetables.
SB 29's most consequential single-provision change is the § 21.552(a)(3) derivative-action ownership-threshold authorization, which permits an eligible Texas corporation to elect a derivative-standing threshold of up to 3% of outstanding shares via certificate or bylaw amendment. The SMU CGI canonical formulation of how this provision operates is reproduced verbatim below; it must be applied across every downstream SMU CGI material.
Section-by-section
What SB 29 changed.
| TBOC section | Change |
|---|---|
| § 1.056 | Texas statutory text and Texas case law come first; managerial officials may consider other states' laws and practices but need not conform to them. |
| § 2.115 | Governing documents may require one or more Texas courts with jurisdiction to serve as the exclusive forum and venue for internal-entity claims. |
| § 2.116 | Governing documents may contain enforceable jury-trial waivers for internal-entity claims, subject to knowing-and-informed-waiver rules. |
| § 21.218 | For qualifying corporations, certain e-mails, texts, social media, and litigation-adjacent demands are limited in books-and-records practice. |
| § 21.416(g) | Board may form independent / disinterested committees to review transactions involving the corporation or subsidiaries and a controlling shareholder, director, or officer. |
| § 21.4161 | Corporation may petition for a judicial determination that committee members are independent and disinterested before the transaction is reviewed. Pre-transaction, prospective. |
| § 21.418(f) | Interested-director / officer transaction liability is routed through § 21.419 for covered corporations. |
| § 21.419 | Codifies the business-judgment-rule presumption and liability standard for listed corporations and opt-ins. |
| § 21.552(a)(3) | Permits eligible corporations to adopt a derivative-standing ownership threshold not exceeding 3% of outstanding shares. Dual-axis canonical formulation applies — see section below. |
| § 21.554 | Adds an expedited post-demand evidentiary-hearing procedure: a 45-day hearing and a 75-day determination. The court's finding is dispositive absent newly-presented facts. |
§ 21.419 · business-judgment rule
The statutory business-judgment-rule presumption.
Section 21.419 applies automatically to Texas for-profit corporations with voting securities listed on a national securities exchange, and to other Texas for-profit corporations that opt in through their governing documents. It establishes a presumption that directors and officers act (i) in good faith, (ii) on an informed basis, (iii) in furtherance of the corporation's interests, and (iv) in obedience to applicable law and the corporation's governing documents.
To rebut the presumption, a claimant must prove a breach involving fraud, intentional misconduct, an ultra-vires act, or a knowing violation of law. Those allegations must be pleaded with particularity. The pleading-with-particularity requirement — common in securities-fraud practice under PSLRA but unusual in state corporate-law derivative practice — substantially raises the threshold for surviving a motion to dismiss.
The interaction between § 21.419's pleading-with-particularity standard and Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a (motion-to-dismiss practice) will be developed over the first wave of post-SB-29 derivative litigation. Defense-bar practitioners anticipate that § 21.419 will substantially reduce the proportion of derivative complaints that survive motion-to-dismiss practice in covered Texas corporations.
§ 21.552(a)(3) · derivative-standing threshold
The dual-axis canonical formulation.
Section 21.552(a)(3) permits an eligible Texas corporation to adopt a derivative-action ownership threshold by certificate of formation or bylaw amendment, with notice in a proxy statement, not exceeding 3% of outstanding shares. The provision is the single most commonly mis-framed section of the TBOC reform package. The SMU CGI canonical formulation must be applied verbatim across every downstream material.
SMU CGI canonical formulation · apply verbatim
TBOC § 21.552(a)(3) operates on two axes: a ceiling on what the corporation may elect (any value ≤ 3%, or decline to elect at all) AND, once elected, a floor on what the shareholder must own to have derivative standing (the elected value is the minimum). Both framings describe the same statutory mechanism from different vantage points — corporate-election perspective vs. shareholder-standing perspective. Do not write "ceiling not floor" or "floor not ceiling" as a standalone correction; surface both axes.
This dual-axis formulation is canonical across the SMU CGI corpus per ERRATA–2026-05-19 Round 2 Item A. The Reincorporation Tracker's sb29.html lede, the V08 Texas Corporate Law (TBOC) vertical callout, and PROJECT_INDUCTION § 7 all carry the same formulation. Any reviewer feedback that tries to revert to a single-axis correction should be evaluated against this canonical formulation, not against either single-axis framing.
Why the dual-axis framing matters
The "ceiling" framing speaks to corporate counsel: what can the corporation elect when amending its certificate or bylaws? Any value at or below 3%, or no election at all. The "floor" framing speaks to plaintiff counsel: what does the demanding shareholder have to own to have derivative-suit standing? At least the elected value. Both are correct; neither is the canonical framing in isolation. The dual-axis formulation captures the statute's structure precisely.
For a firm at Tesla, Inc.'s market capitalization (~$1.5T), a 3% threshold corresponds to ~$45B of stock. That number sharply reduces the population of stockholders who can credibly press a derivative claim to a handful of institutional holders and activist funds. The doctrinal change relative to the Delaware regime — which has no statutory ownership floor at the standing stage — is not subtle.
§§ 21.4161 / 21.554 · the two procedural innovations
Pre-transaction independence determination vs. post-demand evidentiary hearing.
SB 29's procedural architecture distinguishes two analytically separate questions: (i) before a transaction is consummated, can the corporation get a definitive judicial determination that the committee considering it is independent and disinterested? (ii) after a derivative demand is made, can the corporation get an accelerated evidentiary hearing on independence? Section 21.4161 addresses the first; section 21.554 addresses the second.
§ 21.4161 · prospective, pre-transaction
Section 21.4161 permits a Texas corporation to file a petition in the appropriate Texas court for a determination, in advance of a contemplated transaction, that its directors are independent and that the transaction is procedurally clean. The doctrinal effect is to allow the corporation to lock in business-judgment review prospectively, rather than relying on retrospective entire-fairness adjudication after the transaction has closed and a stockholder challenge is filed.
This is a substantial structural innovation. The Delaware Chancery framework permits motion-to-dismiss arguments based on the existence of an independent committee, but does not provide a mechanism for definitively establishing independence before the transaction occurs. Section 21.4161 fills that gap. For deal planners, the practical implication is that significant controller transactions in Texas-incorporated firms may now move through a pre-transaction independence-determination filing as standard practice.
§ 21.554 · retrospective, post-demand
Section 21.554 operates after a derivative demand has been served. Upon the corporation's petition in response to the demand, the court holds an evidentiary hearing within 45 days and issues a determination within 75 days. The court's finding is dispositive of the independence and disinterestedness of the committee considering the demand, absent newly-presented facts.
The 45-day hearing / 75-day determination timetable is one of the fastest procedural schedules in any state derivative-action statute. For comparison, Delaware Chancery's typical motion-to-dismiss timetable in a derivative action runs 12–18 months from filing through decision. Section 21.554 compresses the most procedurally important question — the independence of the demand-evaluating committee — to a roughly 11-week window.
Both, not one or the other
Section 21.4161 and section 21.554 are not alternative procedures. They address different doctrinal moments. Section 21.4161 is the prospective tool used during transaction planning. Section 21.554 is the retrospective tool used after a stockholder demand. A Texas corporation in a controller transaction will often use both: 21.4161 prospectively to lock in independence pre-closing, and 21.554 retrospectively if a derivative demand is then filed.
§§ 2.115 / 2.116 · forum and jury-trial waivers
Statutory exclusive forum and jury-trial waiver authority.
SB 29's forum and jury-trial-waiver provisions are best understood as authorizing two distinct private-ordering instruments: an exclusive-forum-selection provision under § 2.115 and a jury-trial-waiver provision under § 2.116. Both apply only to "internal-entity claims" — broadly, claims arising under the TBOC or under the corporation's governing documents.
§ 2.115 · exclusive Texas forum and venue
Section 2.115 permits governing documents to require that one or more Texas courts (including the Texas Business Court created by SB 27 and expanded by HB 40) serve as the exclusive forum and venue for internal-entity claims. The Texas Business Court's status as a specialized corporate-law venue, together with the new Fifteenth Court of Appeals as the dedicated appellate venue, is the structural attraction.
Section 2.115's exclusive-forum provisions are independent of the federal forum-selection-clause framework. A § 2.115 provision is enforceable on its own terms as a matter of Texas internal-affairs doctrine; the federal-forum question (e.g., for Securities Act claims under Salzberg v. Sciabacucchi) is analytically separate.
§ 2.116 · jury-trial waiver for internal-entity claims
Section 2.116 permits governing documents to contain enforceable jury-trial waivers for internal-entity claims, subject to standard knowing-and-informed-waiver rules. The constitutional and procedural questions around jury-waiver provisions in corporate governing documents are still developing; Texas's statutory authorization is a substantial cleanup of the doctrinal uncertainty under prior law.
The jury-trial-waiver provision is doctrinally distinct from but practically complementary to Nevada's NRS § 78.046 jury-trial-waiver authority (added by AB 239 in 2025). The two states' approaches are converging on similar structural results through different statutory drafting choices.
Drafting note · section-number discipline
Several early secondary sources transposed § 2.115 and § 2.116. § 2.115 is the exclusive forum-and-venue provision; § 2.116 is the jury-trial-waiver provision. The enrolled SB 29 text and the codified TBOC confirm this ordering. SMU CGI canonical materials enforce this section-number discipline; do not propagate transposed references.
§ 21.218 · books-and-records reform
Narrowing § 21.218 inspection rights for qualifying corporations.
Texas's parallel to Delaware SB 21's § 220 reform is the TBOC § 21.218 narrowing. For qualifying corporations, certain e-mails, text messages, social-media communications, and litigation-adjacent demands are excluded from the scope of inspectable books-and-records on a § 21.218 demand. The narrowing is intended to address the same litigation phenomenon Delaware addressed: stockholder books-and-records demands operating, in practice, as broad pre-discovery vehicles.
Texas's approach differs from Delaware's in two structural respects. First, § 21.218 narrows the scope of inspectable materials directly rather than enumerating accessible categories with a compelling-need escape valve for additional materials. Second, the qualifying-corporation framework is not opt-in by election; it applies as a matter of statutory text to corporations meeting the qualifying criteria. The practical operational implications of the two approaches will become measurable as the first wave of post-SB-29 inspection demands works through Texas courts.
Doctrinal context
Why Texas built a rule-of-code regime.
SB 29 should be framed as Texas's affirmative architectural alternative to the Delaware standards-based model. Where Delaware preserves entire-fairness review for transactions outside the § 144 safe harbor and relies on Chancery's case-by-case application of fact-intensive standards, Texas's choice is to codify the business-judgment rule, route fiduciary questions through accelerated procedural channels, and use private-ordering instruments (forum, jury waiver, derivative threshold) to allocate dispute-resolution authority. The two regimes converge on similar substantive outcomes for many transactions but diverge sharply on procedure.
The political economy of SB 29's enactment is closely connected to the post-Tornetta redomiciliation wave. Tesla, Inc.'s June 2024 DE→TX conversion was the most visible early move; the SMU CGI Reincorporation Tracker's 118-firm dataset documents the broader cohort. SB 29 made Texas's competitive proposition substantially more credible by giving Texas-incorporated corporations a recognizable rule-based governance regime that practitioners and counsel can navigate with reasonable certainty about expected outcomes.
Christine Hurt and others in the corporate-law academy have characterized SB 29 as Texas's contribution to a broader "controller-primacy" reform arc — a label that captures the directional shift in derivative-standing thresholds and BJR codification but understates the procedural innovations (§ 21.4161 / § 21.554) that are arguably the more durable contribution. Empirical work documenting market reaction to SB 29 enactment is in early development; the SMU CGI cohort event study is one of the leading projects.
Open questions
What Texas courts will have to resolve.
1. How does § 21.419's pleading-with-particularity standard interact with Texas Rule 91a?
The pleading-with-particularity requirement is a substantial procedural shift. The first wave of post-SB-29 motions to dismiss under Texas Rule 91a will set the operative threshold. Defense-bar practitioners anticipate a significant reduction in derivative-complaint survival rates; plaintiff-bar practitioners are developing pleading templates designed to satisfy the heightened standard.
2. Does the § 21.4161 pre-transaction determination meaningfully eliminate post-closing fiduciary exposure?
The statute provides that the court's pre-transaction determination is dispositive of the independence and disinterestedness questions, absent newly-presented facts. The first appellate-court application of "newly-presented facts" will define how much residual post-closing exposure remains.
3. How will the Texas Business Court and Fifteenth Court of Appeals develop SB 29 doctrine?
The Texas Business Court's jurisdictional scope was expanded by HB 40 (effective Sep 1, 2025). The Fifteenth Court of Appeals is the new dedicated appellate venue. The first decade of Texas Business Court and Fifteenth Court of Appeals decisions interpreting SB 29 will define the operative doctrinal contours.
4. How many firms adopt the § 21.552(a)(3) threshold, and at what value?
The provision permits any value at or below 3%. Will firms adopt the maximum 3%, or smaller thresholds (1%, 0.5%)? The adoption-tracker page surfaces the empirical record as it develops. Early adopters' threshold choices will set the market norm.
5. Will federal courts respect § 2.115 exclusive-forum provisions for federal-question internal-affairs claims?
The intersection of § 2.115 with federal-court jurisdiction over corporate-law claims is doctrinally unsettled. The relevant precedent (Salzberg v. Sciabacucchi; Atlas Air Worldwide Holdings) developed in the Delaware context; the Texas equivalent will develop as § 2.115 provisions are litigated in federal courts.
Primary sources
Where every footnote on this page points.
Per the SMU CGI primary-sources-only rule, every citation on this page hyperlinks the primary source.
- S.B. 29, 89th Leg., R.S. (Tex. 2025). Enrolled act. Signed by Governor Greg Abbott May 14, 2025; effective immediately. https://capitol.texas.gov/BillLookup/History.aspx?LegSess=89R&Bill=SB29
- Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code § 21.419 (post-SB 29). Codified statute: business-judgment-rule presumption and liability standard for listed and opt-in Texas corporations. https://statutes.capitol.texas.gov/Docs/BO/htm/BO.21.htm#21.419
- Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code § 21.552(a)(3) (post-SB 29). Codified statute: derivative-action ownership-threshold authorization. https://statutes.capitol.texas.gov/Docs/BO/htm/BO.21.htm#21.552
- Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code § 21.4161 (post-SB 29). Codified statute: pre-transaction determination of director independence. https://statutes.capitol.texas.gov/Docs/BO/htm/BO.21.htm#21.4161
- Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code § 21.554 (post-SB 29). Codified statute: post-demand evidentiary hearing; 45-day hearing / 75-day determination. https://statutes.capitol.texas.gov/Docs/BO/htm/BO.21.htm#21.554
- Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code § 2.115 (post-SB 29). Codified statute: exclusive-forum-selection authority for internal-entity claims. https://statutes.capitol.texas.gov/Docs/BO/htm/BO.2.htm#2.115
- Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code § 2.116 (post-SB 29). Codified statute: jury-trial-waiver authority for internal-entity claims. https://statutes.capitol.texas.gov/Docs/BO/htm/BO.2.htm#2.116
- Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code § 21.218 (post-SB 29). Codified statute: books-and-records inspection narrowing for qualifying corporations. https://statutes.capitol.texas.gov/Docs/BO/htm/BO.21.htm#21.218
Continue
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Texas SB 1057 → opt-in shareholder-proposal threshold
The companion Texas reform — TBOC § 21.373 opt-in $1M-or-3% disjunctive threshold for nationally-listed corporations that opt in via certificate or bylaw.
V09 · Texas
Texas HB 40 → Business Court expansion
Where SB 29 creates the substantive rules, HB 40 expands the institutional venue that applies them. Four-prong amendment including sunset removal and aggregation of joined-party claims.
V09 · Delaware
Delaware SB 21 → controller safe harbors and books-and-records reform
The Delaware comparator. SB 21 codified statutory safe harbors within a preserved entire-fairness framework. Texas SB 29 codified the business-judgment rule and built procedural accelerators around it. Different architectures, parallel competitive aims.