V09 · Texas

Effective Sep 1, 2025

Texas Senate Bill 1057: the opt-in shareholder-proposal threshold.

SB 1057 codifies TBOC § 21.373, which permits an eligible nationally-listed Texas corporation that opts in through its governing documents to impose heightened ownership, holding-period, and solicitation requirements for shareholder proposals. The ownership requirement is satisfied disjunctively — either $1 million in market value or 3% of outstanding voting shares.

Canonical citation. S.B. 1057, 89th Leg., R.S. (Tex. 2025). Codified at Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code § 21.373. Signed by Governor Greg Abbott May 19, 2025; effective September 1, 2025. Enrolled act: capitol.texas.gov/BillLookup/History.aspx?LegSess=89R&Bill=SB1057. Codified TBOC § 21.373: statutes.capitol.texas.gov/Docs/BO/htm/BO.21.htm#21.373.

Executive summary

A single-provision statute with state-federal significance.

TBOC § 21.373 is a one-section statute, but it occupies an unusually consequential position in the 2024–2026 reform cycle. Three structural features make it so: (i) it operates only on an opt-in basis — the corporation must affirmatively elect coverage through its certificate of formation or bylaws and provide notice in a proxy statement; (ii) the ownership requirement is disjunctive, not conjunctive — either the $1 million market-value threshold or the 3% voting-shares threshold suffices; and (iii) the federal-state significance grew substantially after October 2025 when SEC Chair Paul Atkins endorsed state-law-grounded exclusion under Rule 14a-8(i)(1) as the principal exception to the SEC's Nov 17 2025 Division of Corporation Finance no-action retreat.

This page treats § 21.373 on its own terms. The cross-vertical significance — how § 21.373 interacts with Rule 14a-8(i)(1) and the post-Nov-17 federal-state interface — is treated in the companion V10 vertical at Texas shareholder-proposal thresholds.

The threshold

$1 million market value or 3% voting shares.

The most common drafting error in secondary coverage of § 21.373 is treating the two prongs as conjunctive ("both required") or as "whichever is less." Both readings are wrong. The statute is disjunctive: either threshold is independently sufficient.

Prong A · market value

$1,000,000

At least $1 million in market value of the corporation's voting securities, held by the proponent continuously for at least six months and through the meeting date.

Prong B · voting shares

3% of voting

At least 3% of the corporation's outstanding voting shares, held by the proponent continuously for at least six months and through the meeting date.

EITHER prong is sufficient

The statutory text is explicit: a proponent who satisfies either the dollar-value threshold (Prong A) or the percentage threshold (Prong B) meets the ownership requirement, provided that the holding-period and solicitation requirements are also satisfied. The proponent does not need to meet both; either is independently sufficient.

Beyond the ownership requirement, the statute imposes two additional requirements: (i) a six-month continuous-holding period running up through the meeting date; and (ii) a solicitation requirement that the proponent solicit holders representing at least 67% of the voting power on the proposal. The 67% solicitation requirement is the most operationally demanding of the three; for proponents with limited resources, satisfying it is the principal practical barrier to using § 21.373 in a covered corporation.

Drafting note · common framing errors

Three framings of § 21.373 propagated in early secondary coverage are incorrect and should not be propagated in SMU CGI deliverables: (1) "$1 million AND 3% required" (conjunctive); (2) "$1 million OR 3%, whichever is less" (treating $1M as a built-in cap on the dollar prong); (3) "the lower of $1M and 3%" (similar conjunctive-cap reading). The correct framing per the enrolled act and codified statute is the disjunctive "either suffices" framing. This was the subject of ERRATA–2026-05-19 Item 6 across the SMU CGI dispatch packages.

Opt-in mechanics

How a corporation opts in.

Section 21.373 applies only if an eligible nationally-listed Texas corporation affirmatively elects coverage through its governing documents. The election is operationalized in two parallel ways:

Certificate-of-formation amendment

The corporation may amend its certificate of formation to incorporate the § 21.373 thresholds. Certificate amendment typically requires both board approval and stockholder approval under TBOC § 21.364. The certificate-amendment path is the more durable mechanism — certificate provisions are harder to reverse than bylaws.

Bylaw amendment

The corporation may amend its bylaws to incorporate the § 21.373 thresholds. Bylaw amendment typically requires only board approval under most Texas corporate bylaw frameworks, although stockholders generally retain the right to amend bylaws themselves. The bylaw-amendment path is the more procedurally accessible mechanism but is less durable than certificate amendment.

Proxy-statement notice requirement

Whichever path the corporation uses, the statute requires notice in a proxy statement before the amendment takes effect for stockholder-proposal purposes. The notice requirement ensures that stockholders considering a future proposal have advance warning of the heightened threshold.

"Nationally listed" eligibility

The opt-in mechanism is available only to Texas corporations whose voting securities are listed on a national securities exchange (NYSE, Nasdaq, etc.). Private Texas corporations and over-the-counter-only Texas corporations are not eligible to opt in under § 21.373.

Federal-state interaction

§ 21.373 and Rule 14a-8(i)(1).

The federal-state significance of § 21.373 increased substantially after October 2025. SEC Chair Paul Atkins's October 9, 2025 Keynote Address at the John L. Weinberg Center for Corporate Governance's 25th Anniversary Gala specifically endorsed state-law-grounded exclusion of shareholder proposals under Rule 14a-8(i)(1). The November 17, 2025 SEC Division of Corporation Finance Statement on the Rule 14a-8 process for the 2025–2026 proxy season confirmed that the Division will continue to review — effectively as the only substantive Division review remaining — no-action requests asserting that a proposal is "not a proper subject for action by stockholders" under applicable state law.

A Texas corporation that has opted into § 21.373 has, in effect, a state-law-grounded basis for excluding proposals that do not meet the heightened ownership, holding-period, or solicitation thresholds. The (i)(1) state-law route gives the corporation a procedurally clear path to seek Division no-action concurrence even under the post-Nov-17 framework. The combination is one of the cleanest federal-state interfaces produced by the 2025 reform cycle.

The comparative analytical question — whether Texas's visible-statutory approach (a codified threshold in § 21.373) achieves the same practical end as Delaware's invisible-practice approach (the post-Nov-17 (i)(1) state-law-improper-subject route, working through opinion-of-counsel practice rather than statutory amendment) — is treated in the V10 companion vertical. Both routes substantially narrow the population of shareholder proposals reaching corporate proxies; the methodological difference is whether the narrowing operates through a statutory text or through a federal-administrative-practice change.

Cross-vertical reference

For the full federal-state framing — the post-Nov-17 SEC Division of Corporation Finance retreat, the Atkins keynote, the (i)(1) improper-subject theory, the Pinder doctrinal source (15 Mich. Bus. & Entrepreneurial L. Rev. 1 (2026)), and the Crenshaw dissent — see V10 Shareholder Franchise and Private Ordering.

Open questions

What the adoption record will show.

1. How many nationally-listed Texas corporations opt in?

The opt-in design means that § 21.373's empirical reach depends entirely on adoption. The SMU CGI adoption tracker surfaces the firms electing § 21.373 via certificate or bylaw amendment, with cross-references to the underlying EDGAR filings. The first 12–24 months of adoption activity will define how widely the provision actually operates.

2. Does § 21.373 deter proposals at the submission stage or only at the review stage?

The 67% solicitation requirement is operationally demanding before any (i)(1) exclusion analysis. Proponents with limited resources may simply not submit proposals to opted-in corporations, regardless of whether their ownership satisfies one of the two prongs. The empirical question is whether the chilling effect operates ex ante (proposals not submitted) or ex post (proposals submitted and then excluded).

3. How does the disjunctive ownership framing interact with passively-managed institutional holders?

An institutional holder with $5M in beneficial ownership across multiple Texas-incorporated portfolio firms easily satisfies Prong A in any single firm but may fall short of 3% (Prong B) in large-cap firms. The disjunctive structure is institutionally permissive. The question is whether this is by design (acknowledging the institutional-investor channel) or a drafting accident (intended to set a high single bar).

4. How will the proxy-statement notice requirement interact with mid-year amendments?

The proxy-notice requirement is timing-sensitive: the corporation must provide notice in a proxy statement before the amended threshold takes effect for proposal purposes. The interaction between annual-meeting proxy timing, mid-year bylaw amendments, and proposal-deadline rules under Rule 14a-8(e) will be developed by the first wave of practitioner guidance.

Primary sources

Where every footnote on this page points.

Per the SMU CGI primary-sources-only rule, every citation on this page hyperlinks the primary source.